A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: the relationship between diffusion, learning economies and subsidies by Cantono, S. & Silverberg, G.P.
  
 
A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: the
relationship between diffusion, learning economies
and subsidies
Citation for published version (APA):
Cantono, S., & Silverberg, G. P. (2008). A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: the relationship
between diffusion, learning economies and subsidies. (UNU-MERIT Working Papers; No. 025).
Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation
and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2008
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
#2008-025 
 
A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: the relationship 
between diffusion, learning economies and subsidies 
 
Simona Cantono and Gerald Silverberg 
Working Paper Series 
 
United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology 
 Keizer Karelplein 19,  6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499, e-mail: info@merit.unu.edu, URL: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 2 
 3 
A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: the relationship between diffusion, 
learning economies and subsidies 
 
Simona Cantonoa and Gerald Silverbergb 
 
a
 Department of Economics “S. Cognetti de Martiis”, University of Turin, Italy. 
simona.cantono@unito.it 
b IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria and UNU-MERIT, Maastricht, The Netherlands. 
gerald.silverberg@merit.unimaas.nl 
 
Abstract 
An obstacle to the widespread adoption of environmentally friendly energy technologies such 
as stationary and mobile fuel cells is their high upfront costs. While much lower prices seem 
to be attainable in the future due to learning curve cost reductions that increase rapidly with 
the scale of diffusion of the technology, there is a chicken and egg problem, even when some 
consumers may be willing to pay more for green technologies. Drawing on recent percolation 
models of diffusion by Solomon et al. [7], Frenken et al. [8] and Höhnisch  et al. [9], we 
develop a network model of new technology diffusion that combines contagion among 
consumers with heterogeneity of agent characteristics. Agents adopt when the price falls 
below their random reservation price drawn from a lognormal distribution, but only when one 
of their neighbors has already adopted. Combining with a learning curve for the price as a 
function of the cumulative number of adopters, this may lead to delayed adoption for a certain 
range of initial conditions. Using agent-based simulations we explore when a limited subsidy 
policy can trigger diffusion that would otherwise not happen. The introduction of a subsidy 
policy seems to be highly effective for a given high initial price level only for learning 
economies in a certain range. Outside this range, the diffusion of a new technology either 
never takes off despite the subsidies, or the subsidies are unnecessary. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, this range seems to correspond to the values observed for many successful 
innovations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The diffusion of new technologies often depends upon the interrelations between social and 
technical aspects [1]. On the one hand, communication channels and social networks play a 
central role in the widespread adoption of innovation [2]. Information contagion and imitation 
effects are widely recognized as crucial factors in the process of diffusion of innovations. In 
the particular case of energy technologies, and especially in the case of hydrogen and fuel 
cells technologies, demonstration effects and increased confidence play a significant role. On 
the other hand, technical factors such as the degree of complexity, compatibility and special 
features [3] directly influence the initial cost levels of innovations. High upfront costs are 
among the main factors that prevent the widespread diffusion of new technologies, and this is 
especially true for environmental energy technologies. The degree of learning economies is of 
primary importance in this context. New technologies characterized by high learning cost 
curve reductions will have a greater chance to break into mainstream markets. If a new 
technology has the chance to develop first in niche markets one could then exploit cost 
reductions in these markets due to learning curve effects when it is introduced into the 
mainstream market. For instance, in the case of environmentally friendly energy technologies, 
a potential niche for market entry might be created by the willingness of some particularly 
environmentally conscious and high-income consumers to pay more for products that are 
perceived to be green (an example is the Toyota Prius hybrid car in the US, called 
“Hollywood’s latest politically correct status symbol” by the Washington Post1). 
However, even if much lower prices seem to be attainable in the future due to learning 
curve cost reductions that increase rapidly with the scale of diffusion of the technology, there 
is a chicken and egg problem. It is not clear when a technology will pass the threshold that 
permits widespread adoption and competitive market pricing, and when it will fail. The latter 
seems too often to be the case without long-term subsidies. 
There exist a wide variety of policy options available to decision makers to influence 
this process. They may be roughly divided in two categories: demand-pull and technology-
push policies. Even if a mix of the two is actually necessary, especially in the case of 
renewable energy sources [4], we will analyze the effect of one particular policy option that 
belongs to the first category: adoption subsidies for consumers. According to Turkenburg [5], 
the innovation diffusion process can be split into two parts: early deployment in which costs 
                                               
1
 The Washington Post, June 2, 2002, p. C01. 
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decline, and widespread dissemination in which institutional barriers are overcome and 
investments increase. A potential policy strategy related to the first phase of diffusion is 
represented by temporary subsidies followed by a phasing-out policy during the period of 
pervasive diffusion. In practice, however, especially with regard to environmentally friendly 
energy technologies, we often find permanent subsidy policies because the diffusion of such 
innovations is frequently not self-sustainable. Thus one can ask what policy actions may be 
implemented to support the diffusion of a new energy technology to market maturity that are 
socially profitable? In other words, which kinds of subsidy policies can trigger a self-
sustained diffusion of these particular technologies that ultimately justifies the upfront social 
expenditures? 
Drawing on recent percolation models [6, 7, 8, 9] of diffusion, which combine the 
contagion aspect (e.g., epidemic models) with the heterogeneity of agent characteristics (e.g., 
Probit or heterogeneous threshold models), we develop and analyze a network model of new 
technology diffusion. Agents adopt when the price falls below their random reservation price 
drawn from a lognormal distribution, but only when one of their neighbors has already 
adopted. Combining with a learning curve for the price as a function of the cumulative 
number of adopters, this may lead to delayed adoption for a certain range of initial conditions. 
Using agent-based simulations (ABS) we explore when a limited subsidy policy can trigger 
diffusion that would otherwise not happen. As a main result we find that subsidies are not 
helpful both when learning economies are too low (and thus reasonable temporary subsidies 
fail to trigger diffusion), and when learning economies are too high, (and diffusion would 
take-off anyway). However, for a certain range of learning coefficients a temporary subsidy 
policy may indeed trigger self-sustained diffusion provided that the level of subsidies is high 
enough. 
The article is organized as follows. Section two gives a brief overview of the existing 
literature on percolation diffusion models, learning curves and subsidies. The details of the 
model and the methodology are discussed in section three. In section four we present the 
results. Interpretations and conclusions are discussed in section five. 
 
II. Extending standard models of diffusion by introducing percolation, learning curves 
and subsidies 
 
Innovation diffusion has been investigated using different approaches [10]. In particular, the 
S-shaped diffusion models and the epidemic models stem from two lines of research 
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originating in Griliches’ empirical investigation [11] and Mansfield’s contributions [12, 13]. 
In general, diffusion models can be classified as epidemic models, Probit models, legitimation 
and competition models, and information cascades models [14]. In what follows we focus in 
the first two categories: epidemic and Probit models. While the former emphasizes the effects 
of information contagion, it usually presupposes agent homogeneity. The latter is especially 
relevant in stressing the effects of agent heterogeneity but it neglects a description of the 
interrelations among individuals. The percolation model developed in the present paper 
incorporates both information contagion and agent heterogeneity. Agents interact on a 
specific network structure called the Ising network [2]. According to Stauffer and Aharony 
[15], percolation was originally applied by Flory and Stockmayer during the Second World 
War  to describe critical phenomena for the process of gelation. Broadbent and Hammersley 
introduced the name percolation theory in 1957. Percolation explains, for example, how a 
fluid can traverse a porous material. But it has been applied to other cases, like the 
investigation of forest fires or stock market bubbles. As a simple example we explain the 
simple case of an atemporal site-percolation model. In a two-dimensional square lattice, 
assign randomly either 0 or 1 to each site. The values are stochastically independent and P  is 
the probability for the realization of value 1, 1-P for value 0. Percolation is said to occur if 
there exist at least one unbounded cluster of sites with value 1. It can be shown that there is a 
critical value cP , such that for cPP <  percolation will not occur. On the contrary, if cPP >  
percolation will occur with probability 1 ( 592743.0=cP ). Percolation theory has been 
applied to social science [7] as well as to the economics of technology diffusion [8, 9]. 
The process of diffusion of new products and technologies often occurs on different 
time scales. It often starts with a few early adopters, followed by an increasing cumulative 
number as time passes. Moreover, it often follows an S-shaped path of diffusion. The market 
price may have to fall below some threshold level, however, before this process of diffusion 
can take off. 
Hohnisch et al. [9] have used percolation theory to explain what determines delayed 
take-offs in the diffusion of new products and what happens to the price’s threshold level: 
macroscopic effects either on the demand side or on the supply side or both can trigger the 
process of diffusion even for price levels initially higher than the threshold. What they call 
macroscopic effects may be interpreted as interdependency among potential buyers’ choices 
on the one hand and learning curve cost reductions on the other. The notion of learning curves 
is well known in the literature [16] and refers to the unit cost reductions due to increasing 
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production. Thus costs and price decrease with the increasing number of new adopters. In [9] 
the model assumes that consumers’ willingness to pay is drawn from a uniform distribution 
on the interval [0, 1]. In order to incorporate consumers’ aptitude to “greenness“, we assume 
that the reservation price is distributed according to the highly skewed lognormal distribution 
such is characteristic of many other economic variables such as personal income and wealth. 
We then develop a model that combines both the network effect and the heterogeneity of 
agents. While the present version adopts the lattice type network structure, in principle it can 
easily be generalized to other network topologies that better reflect the communication 
channels influencing consumer behavior at both the local and global levels. 
The approach in [9] can be enriched by introducing policy actions intended to trigger 
widespread adoption of a new product such as subsidy policies. We modify their model in 
order to explore when subsidies may trigger the process of diffusion of eco-innovations. In 
particular, we investigate when diffusion can become self-sustaining after an initial policy of 
temporary subsidies. In the next section we specify the details of the model’s structure and 
equations. 
 
III. The Model 
 
Consider a finite number of consumers distributed on a two-dimensional lattice with periodic 
boundary conditions (i.e., a torus). Each consumer is faced with the choice of whether of not 
to buy a new technology available in the market. Whether she will buy it depends on two 
factors: her neighbors’ choices and her willingness to pay for that new product. She will first 
consider purchasing the product if it has already been bought by at least one of her neighbors. 
If this condition is fulfilled she will then compare the market price of the new technology to 
her reservation price: she will buy it if the latter is higher than the former. 
The model explains diffusion as a process of spreading news or “keeping up with the 
Jones’s”. This reflects the fact that the adoption of new products may often be the result of 
imitation behaviors (in the particular case of hydrogen and fuel cells technology, a testimony 
of reliability and safety may be fundamental). In part this may simply result from status 
considerations, but it may also be an essential element in reducing informational uncertainty 
about product characteristics and suitability. In addition, the model analyzes diffusion as 
resulting from the interaction of heterogeneous behaviors. Consumers’ initial willingness to 
pay for the new product is drawn from a lognormal distribution at the beginning of the 
simulation. It might reasonably be argued that agents with a high income are characterized by 
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a higher reservation price (e.g. they are more inclined to pay for the environmental quality of 
a product).  
A schematic representation of such a network neighborhood is presented in Figure 1. 
Consumer i is of type 0—she has not yet acquired the technology. Type 1 consumers such as 
the ones on the left and above have already adopted the technology in previous periods. She 
knows about the availability of the new product2 (e.g. at least one of her neighbors has already 
bought it). Her reservation price is θi, [ ]∞∈ ,0iθ , where ( )σµθ ,LogN≈  with 0≥σ  and 
0>µ  ( µ  and σ  are parameters of the model corresponding to the mean and standard 
deviation of the underlying normal distribution). A standard learning curve will be applied to 
the price of the new technology at time t according to equation {1}: 
 
                                               
2
 We assume in this model that consumers collect information at zero costs. 
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it nN is the cumulative number of adopters ( in  is the number of adopters in 
period i). The initial price [ ]+∞∈ ,00p  and 0≥α  are parameters of the model. The 
subsidy rate on the price is 10, ≤≤ ss . In contrast to [9], the only macro effect 
modeled in our analysis is represented by the learning curve. We do not assume that 
the consumers’ reservation prices will decrease with the number of adopters. In the 
basic percolation model, percolation occurs when the probability that iθ  is greater 
than the market price tp  is less than the critical value cP  (for a square lattice 
593.0≈cP ). With a lognormal distribution, the integral of the density function at tp  
must be less than cP−1 . In that case product diffusion will take off. After the 
occurrence of percolation we know that a certain number of agents, depending on the 
path of diffusion of percolation, have bought the product. According to the Probit 
model, if the reservation price is log-normally distributed then the probability to buy 
{ }0Pr >yob  in the static case is: 
 
{ } { } ( )pFyobob −=>=> 10PrPr *θθ ,  {2}
 
where ( )pF  is the cumulative probability function at p, the market price of the new 
product. In the case with learning this leads to dynamic equations of the form: 
 
{ } { } ( )tt pFyobob −=>=> + 10PrPr 1*θθ ,  {3}
where 
α






=
t
t N
N
pp 00 and { }tt obNN *Pr θθ >⋅= . N  is the total number of 
potential adopters, 0N  is the initial number of buyers, tN  is the cumulative number 
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of adopters at time t, and tp  is the market price of the new technology that is 
dependent on the initial price 0p  and on the number of initial adopters at time t as 
specified in equation 1. In the following we will compare the cumulative percentage 
of adopters at the percolation threshold with the level predicted by the Probit model 
both without and with learning (respectively called lower and upper bounds of 
diffusion). The percentage of buyers from a percolation model will never exceed the 
value attained by the corresponding Probit model, but it will when subsidies will be 
introduced. The cumulative percentage of adopters computed by a Probit model with 
constant price provides a lower bound for it tells us the maximum number of 
consumers willing to buy the product in the absence of learning economies. 
 
IV. Results and interpretation 
 
The following figures show the results obtained by simulating the model on a 
100x100 square lattice. The results for each parameter configuration are averaged 
over ten simulation runs to minimize the effects of statistical variation. Consumers’ 
reservation prices iθ  are drawn from a lognormal distribution ( )Φ≈Θ LogN , where 
( )σµ,N≈Φ is normally distributed with parameters 1=µ  and 2=σ . The number 
of initial adopters is 1000 =N  (that is, 1% of the total number of potential 
consumers). In an environment with learning economies, the initial level of price is 
60 =p . According to the theory, for these numerical values percolation occurs with 
probability 1 for values of 698.1≤tp . Hence, for an initial price 60 =p , we should 
not see any rapid diffusion of the new technology. Introducing price dynamics due to 
the learning curve may change this, however, due to the possibility of delayed 
takeoff [9]. 
In an environment without learning economies ( 0=α ), the ultimate 
percentage of adopters decreases with the exogenous level of prices (Figure 2). In 
addition, it can be seen how much the difference in the computed percentage of 
adopters between the Probit model and the percolation model increases with the price 
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level: for 2.0=p  the results of the two models are almost the same. As p  increases, 
the difference becomes increasingly large. Finally, the percolation model describes a 
delayed diffusion of the new technology even without learning economies: the 
percentage of adopters increases slowly over time and the path is S-shaped. 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the percentage of adopters in 
both Probit and percolation models versus price levels. In the percolation model there 
exists a more non-linear relationship between price level and diffusion. There is a 
threshold level of p  (1.69 for the assumed parameters of the lognormal distribution) 
at which percolation takes place. We see that for values of price lower than the 
threshold the percentage of adopters in the percolation model rapidly approaches the 
results given by the Probit, which forms an upper bound. 
Figure 4 presents the results from the simulations in an environment with 
learning economies but no subsidies, with an initial price level 60 =p  and learning 
coefficients α = 0, 0.2 and 0.4. With the increase of the learning coefficient the 
percentage of adopters rises. The percolation model has both a more delayed path of 
diffusion and a higher sensitivity to learning economies than the Probit model. The 
difference is lower for higher levels of α : for 4.0=α  the results are almost the 
same. 
The results for simulations in a world with learning economies and the 
introduction of subsidies are illustrated in Figures 5-11, where we jointly vary the 
level of subsidies [ ]5.0;4.0;3.0;2.0;1.0;0=s  and the length of subsidies in simulation 
time steps [ ]20;12;4=tMax . 
Direct subsidy policies by governments for eco-innovations are rare. An 
exception is the Japanese policy for promoting photovoltaic [17]. Often policy 
actions in favor of environmentally friendly technologies are a portfolio of different 
approaches implemented to encourage the emergence and the diffusion of the 
technology on both the supply and the demand sides. In the present paper we will 
only model direct subsidies to consumers. 
When will a subsidy policy trigger a self-sustained process of diffusion? This 
depends upon the dynamics of adoption after the phasing out of subsidies. In order to 
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analyze the latter issue we differentiate between three different policy options. Let us 
define as short-term, medium-term and long-term a policy that respectively lasts for 
4, 12, 20 simulation timesteps. Figures 5-8 illustrate the cumulative percentage of 
adopters over time for different values of the parameters s, α  and tMax . Short-term 
subsidies ( 5.02.0 ≤≤ s  and 4=tMax ) trigger a self-sustained process of diffusion 
when the learning coefficient is in the interval 3.00 <≤ α . The cumulative 
percentage of adopters is higher than in the case without subsidies ( 0=s ) and the 
process of diffusion also continues to increase after the phasing-out of subsidies. 
Figure 5 illustrates the case in which 1.0=α . The long-term effect of subsidies 
disappears as the level of α  increases beyond 0.3 (see Figure 9 and Figure 6 for the 
case 4.0=α , where it is also apparent that the rate of diffusion increases somewhat 
with s, even if the ultimate level does not). As the length of the subsidy period 
increases, the effect of subsidies is more striking, even for higher levels of the 
learning coefficient (see Figures 7 and 8 for 4.0=α  and [ ]20;12=tMax  
respectively, as well as Figures 10 and 11 for a complete overview). However only 
medium-term subsidies trigger a self-sustained process of diffusion: the cumulative 
percentage of adopters increases after the phasing-out of subsidies, even if to a lower 
extent than in the former short-term case. Long-term subsidies do not trigger a self-
sustained diffusion: the process of adoption stabilizes before the phasing-out of 
subsidies at every level of both the learning coefficient and the level of subsidies. 
Adoption takes place entirely at a subsidized price level, but the level of diffusion is 
considerably higher than in the short-term subsidy case. 
Whether a policy is a valuable option depends upon the desired level of 
diffusion. Let us take the Probit level of adoption as a benchmark. The new 
technology is adopted and diffuses widely even for initial price levels higher than the 
threshold ( 698.1=p ). However, there exists a threshold level for the learning 
coefficient such that for α  lower than this threshold diffusion does not take-off (e.g., 
it does not exceed the lower bound represented by the level of diffusion given by the 
Probit model without learning). 
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In Figure 9, where the length of subsidies tMax is four simulation time steps 
(the short-term subsidy case), the critical value of α  decreases from 0.27 (with no 
subsidies, 0=s ) to 0.24 (for the highest value of subsidies, 5.0=s ). If the level of 
diffusion from the Probit model without learning is considered as the policy target, 
then a short-term policy may trigger a self-sustained diffusion to that target for 
values of the learning coefficient lower than the critical one but only to a certain 
extent (or, in other words, only in the interval 27.024.0 ≤≤ α ). As the length of 
subsidies increases, the policy influences diffusion for ever larger intervals of α : a 
medium-term policy ( 12=tMax ) triggers diffusion for 27.013.0 ≤≤ α  (Figure 10), 
whereas a long-term policy influences the cumulative percentage of adopters for 
27.009.0 ≤≤ α  (Figure 11). 
The introduction of subsidies affects the threshold level of the learning 
coefficient: as we include a subsidy policy the critical value of α  is likely to 
decrease. A subsidy policy may spur a self-sustained diffusion but the success of 
such policy actions strongly depends on the value of the learning coefficient as well 
as on the level and length of subsidies. If for example government would want to 
support the diffusion of new technology characterized by relatively low learning 
economies (say 15.0=α ) a medium to long-term subsidy policy should be 
introduced: a short-term policy would not trigger diffusion to the target (Probit lower 
bound) for 15.0=α  (see Figure 9), while both a medium-term (Figure 10, 5.0=s ) 
and a long-term subsidy would (Figure 11, [ ]5.0;4.0=s ). 
In summary, short-term subsidies (Figure 9) do not significantly enhance 
diffusion except for rather restricted values of the learning coefficient, when α  
belongs to the interval [0.24-0.27]. When α  is too low ( 24.00 ≤≤ α ) the process 
does not take off even with a high subsidy ( 5.0=s ), and when α  is high ( 27.0≥α ) 
diffusion takes off anyway. Especially for very high levels of the learning coefficient 
( 4.0=α ), the difference between the path of diffusion with and without subsidies 
disappears. This is less true the more the length of subsidies increases: medium-term 
subsidies (Figure 10) affect the percentage of adopters, as do long-term subsidies 
(Figure 11), but only when the level of subsidies is high enough (that is 5.03.0 ≤≤ s  
 15 
in the medium-term and 5.02.0 ≤≤ s in the long-term). Low subsidies do not 
guarantee a significant change in the degree of diffusion, even if we see a stronger 
effect when we switch from a medium-term to a long-term policy. However, the 
introduction of a subsidy policy is only sensible in conjunction with learning 
economies if the initial price is well above the percolation threshold. 
We have seen that subsidies are only effective for learning parameters in a 
certain range (0.2-0.4). Subsidies on the demand side are in some sense dual to R&D 
expenditures on the supply side, which also serve to support developments efforts in 
a technology in the pre-commercial stage until the point where the technology “can 
stand on its own two feet”. Empirical studies have shown that learning parameters of 
successful technologies are indeed, ex post, in this range [18]. This remarkable 
coincidence is perhaps not so surprising since only those technologies for which 
demand-side or R&D subsidies had been successful investments will show up in the 
statistics on learning curves as other technologies having been selected out. 
 
V. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
 
In this article we analyze the relationship between the diffusion of a new technology, 
learning economies, and subsidies. The aim of the research is to investigate the path 
of diffusion of a new energy technology when some consumers are willing to pay 
more for goods that are perceived as “green” and learning economies may reduce the 
price as a function of the extent of previous adoption. An obstacle to the widespread 
adoption of environmentally friendly energy technologies such as stationary fuel 
cells and the use of hydrogen is their high upfront costs. While much lower prices 
seem to be attainable in the future due to learning curve cost reductions that increase 
rapidly with the scale of diffusion of the technology, there is a chicken and egg 
problem, even when some consumers may be willing to pay more for green 
technologies. Policy actions devoted to spurring the diffusion of these kinds of 
technologies may help overcome initial barriers, but in order to be worthwhile, 
governmental interventions should trigger a self-sustained process. It is not clear 
when a technology will pass a threshold to widespread adoption and competitive 
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market pricing, and when it will fail. The latter seems too often to be the case 
without long-term subsidies. 
Among others approaches, epidemic and Probit models have been separately 
used to analyze the process of technology diffusion. We have developed a 
percolation model in which both information contagion and agent heterogeneity are 
taken into account and interact in nontrivial ways. The percolation model is then 
extended to allow for the introduction of learning economies, which then explain the 
delayed take off of new technologies. This results in a more non-linear relationship 
between price levels and the extent of diffusion than in a standard heterogeneous 
threshold (Probit) model. The percolation model has both a more delayed path of 
diffusion and a higher sensitivity to learning economies than the Probit model. The 
new technology is adopted and diffuses even for price levels higher than the 
threshold. But there exists a threshold level for the learning coefficient α  below 
which diffusion does not take off. 
Whether a policy triggers a self-sustained process of diffusion depends upon 
the dynamics of adoption after the phasing-out of subsidies. Short-term subsidies 
( 5.02.0 ≤≤ s  and 4=tMax ) trigger a self-sustained process of diffusion when the 
learning coefficient falls in the interval 3.00 <≤ α . Diffusion continues strongly 
even after the phasing-out of subsidies. But the effect of subsidies diminishes as the 
level of α  increases. As the length of the subsidy period increases, the model shows 
that policy remains effective even for higher level of the learning coefficient.  
However, whether a policy is a valuable option depends upon the desired 
level of diffusion. Let us take the Probit lower bound as the policy target. The 
introduction of subsidies affects the threshold level of the learning coefficient: as we 
include a subsidy policy the critical value of α  is likely to decrease. A subsidy 
policy may spur diffusion but the success of such policy actions strongly depends on 
the value of the learning coefficient as well as on the level and length of subsidies. 
Given the target, short-term subsidies are of limited utility in two cases: when the 
learning coefficient is too low ( 24.00 ≤≤ α ) the process only takes off for very high 
levels of subsidies ( 1=s ), and when α  is high ( 27.0≥α ) diffusion takes off 
anyway. Especially for very high levels of the learning coefficient ( 4.0=α ), the 
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difference between the path of diffusion with and without subsidies disappears. This 
is less true the more the length of subsidies increases: medium-term subsidies 
significantly affect the ultimate level of adopters, as do long-term subsidies. But this 
is true only when the level of subsidies is high (e.g. 5.0=s ): low level of subsidies 
( [ ]2.0;1.0=s ) do not guarantee a relevant change in the degree of diffusion, even if 
we see a stronger effect when we switch from a medium-term to a long-term policy. 
To more fully evaluate the appropriateness of subsidy policies it is necessary 
to formulate some kind of cost-benefit analysis to measure the returns to subsidized 
adoption in terms of additional environmental goods (foregone pollution, for 
example, due to a wider and earlier diffusion of an environmentally friendly 
technology) vs. the subsidy costs to the taxpayer. Our intuition says that there must 
be a “sweet spot” in parameter space and subsidy design space at which subsidies are 
maximally effective in triggering adoption and widespread diffusion without wasting 
money on adopters who would have adopted anyway. Because the system is so 
nonlinear, the existence of such a “sweet spot” seems likely, although whether 
policymakers could always find it in practice, given the uncertainties surrounding the 
learning parameter and consumers’ propensities to adopt, remains to be seen. We are 
currently working on simulation experiments in this direction. 
Additional realism would be added by allowing for a portfolio of new 
technologies to be present instead of the standard assumption of just one innovation 
competing against an incumbent. A simple modification of the present model could 
address this question by using a multinomial decision mechanism to model each 
adopter’s choice. 
 18 
References 
 
[1] D. A. Kirsch, The electric vehicle and the burden of history, Rutgers University 
Press, 2000. 
[2] R. Cowan, Network models of innovation and knowledge diffusion, MERIT 
Infonomics Research Memorandum Series 2004-016 (2004). 
[3] E. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 4th ed., The Free Press, New York, 1995. 
[4] G. F. Nemet, Demand-pull energy technology policies, diffusion and 
improvement in California wind power, Working Paper, University of 
Berkeley (2006). 
[5] W.C. Turkenburg, “The Innovation Chain: Policies to Promote Energy 
Innovations,” in: T.B. Johansson and J. Goldemberg (eds.), Energy for 
Sustainable Development; A Policy Agenda, UNDP, New York, 2002, pp. 
137-172. 
[6] C. Antonelli Localized knowledge percolation processes and information 
networks, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 6 (1996) 281-295. 
[7] S. Solomon, G. Weisbuch, L. de Arcangelis, N. Jan, D. Stauffer, Social 
percolation models, Physica A 277 (2000) 239-247. 
[8] K. Frenken, G. Silverberg, M. Valente A percolation model of the product 
lifecycle, Working paper (2006). 
[9] M. Hohnisch, S. Pittnauer, D. Stauffer, A percolation-based model explaining 
delayed take off in new-product diffusion, Bonn Econ Discussion Paper 9 
(2006). 
[10] G. Silverberg, G. Dosi, L. Orsenigo, Innovation, Diversity and Diffusion: A 
Self-Organization Model. The Economic Journal 98(393) (1988) 1032-1054. 
[11] Z. Griliches, Hybrid corn: an exploration in the economics of technological 
change, Econometrica 25 (1957) 501-522. 
[12] E. Mansfield, Technical change and the rate of imitation, Econometrica 29 
(1961) 741-766. 
[13] E. Mansfield, Industrial research and Technological Innovation, W.W. Norton 
New York, 1968. 
 19 
[14] P. A. Geroski, Models of technology diffusion, Research Policy 29 (2000) 603-
625. 
[15] D. Stauffer and A. Aharony, Introduction to Percolation Theory, 2nd ed., Taylor 
and Francis, 1994. 
[16] K. Arrow, The economic implications of learning by doing, The Review of 
Economic Studies 29(3) (1962) 155-173. 
[17] T. Bradford, Solar revolution: the economic transformation of the global energy 
industry, MIT Press, 2005. 
[18] S. Alberth, Forecasting technology costs via the Learning Curve – Myth or 
Magic?, IIASA Interim Report  IR-06-058, Laxenburg (2006), 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/IR-06-058.pdf. 
 
 20 
Figures 
 
tp , price of the new product at time t 
 
 
 
0 1 1 
1 
Type 0 
( )iθ  0 
0 0 0 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A neighborhood of an agent on the lattice, where 0 represents non-adoption and 1 
adoption of the technology by a neighbor. Θi is the reservation price of agent i.  
 
  
Figure 2: Percentage of adopters over time for different values of the product price p, assumed 
time constant. 
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Figure 3: A comparison between the percentage of adopters for Probit and percolation models 
for different values of the time-independent product price p. 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of adopters over time. A comparison between Probit and percolation 
models with learning for different values of the learning parameter α. 
 
 
Figure 5: Cumulative percentage of adopters over time for α = 0.1 and tMax = 4 for different 
value of the subsidy rate. 
 22 
 
 
Figure 6: Cumulative percentage of adopters over time for α = 0.4 and tMax = 4 for different 
values of the subsidy rate. 
 
 
Figure 7: Cumulative Percentage of adopters over time for α = 0.4 and tMax = 12 for different 
values of the subsidy rate. 
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Figure 8: Cumulative percentage of adopters over time for α = 0.4 and tMax = 20 for different 
values of the subsidy rate. 
  
 
 
Figure 9: Short-term subsidy policy and ultimate level of diffusion for tMax = 4 as a function of 
the learning exponent α for different subsidy rates. 
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Figure 10: Medium-term subsidy policy and ultimate level of diffusion for tMax = 12 as a 
function of the learning exponent α for different subsidy rates. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Long-term subsidy policy and ultimate level of diffusion for tMax = 20 as a function 
of the learning exponent α for different subsidy rates. 
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